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Arming and war can be thought to occur in the absence of commitment devices that could prevent the parties involved from arming or engaging in war if they were to …nd it in their short-run interest to do so. Otherwise, if potential adversaries were able to commit not to arm or not to engage in war, they would all be able to …nd a way to do better since those activities divert resources from production or destroy production. Then, the question of why there is con ‡ict can be reconceptualized as that of why parties are unable to commit not to arm and not to engage in war.
Much thought on this problem in economics, rational-choice political science, and game theory over the past two decades or so has focused on the e¤ects of longterm relationships in developing a measure of commitment between the di¤erent parties in avoiding con ‡ict. With more orthodox game-theoretic tools (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 6 ) cooperation could be achieved between completely self-interested and rational parties if they all were to value the future highly enough. A similar outcome can occur within an evolutionary framework where adversaries are not rational but follow strategies that are successful on average (see, e.g., Axelrod, 1984) . However, cooperation in these settings is not necessary -typically it is not a unique equilibrium -and in many ways the cooperative equilibria can be thought of as being more fragile than those that induce con ‡ict. Moreover, this approach skirts the issue of commitment as it abstracts away from the many institutions that often manage con ‡icts. In practice, constitutions, laws, diplomatic procedures, domestic and international organizations provide some guidance and measure of commitment that other parties will not resort to the barrel of the gun but to their lawyers, diplomats, the negotiating table, and the courts to solve their disputes. And, using and building these institutions and organizations, is costly.
In this paper we take a …rst look at a setting in which con ‡ict management is indeed costly and the potential adversaries can take actions to increase the chance of peace while simultaneously preparing for war. Our modeling takes account of two characteristics of institutions of con ‡ict management. First, they take time to build. For example, the federal structure of the US took more than a century to crystallize and a bloody civil war along the way. The building of EU institutions (which, in its beginnings can be considered a con ‡ict-avoidance device) is more than forty years old and still very much in its infancy in many respects. Almost a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, basic laws about property in land, which would minimize con ‡ict and allow a more e¢cient usage, are still non-existent in almost all of the successor republics. And, all post-war international institutions and organizations have taken much time and e¤ort to build.
The second characteristic that our modeling takes into account is that there is no guarantee that institutions of con ‡ict management bring success in avoiding the worst. That is, the e¤ect of these institutions is up to a point uncertain about their e¤ect on peace. The interwar League of Nations that was meant to prevent a recurrence of the Great War did not prevent World War II, although the experience that had accumulated along the way undoubtedly was utilized in creating the UN. The US Constitution and subsequent legislation and understandings that were carefully put together to balance the interests of Northern and Southern states did not prevent a civil war (see, for example, Weingast, 1998) . And, of course, the various international institutions that exist today have not eliminated war.
We take account of these two characteristics of institutions of con ‡ict management by treating con ‡ict management as (i) the outcome of the "investments" that the potential adversaries may undertake in a dynamic setting that, in turn, (ii) yields a probability of peace and a probability of con ‡ict, with greater levels of investment increasing the probability of peace. According to our approach the adversaries would make such investments for the same reason that they would arm: to maximize their expected income.
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We seek to understand likely implications for the time path of con ‡ict and con ‡ict management. Our most robust, and perhaps in retrospect most obvious, …nding is that how rich the adversaries are has a large e¤ect on the probability of peace. The poorer are the adversaries, in the sense of the real resources they possess, the lower is their investment in con ‡ict management and the lower is the probability of peace. In addition, poorer adversaries will devote proportionately a greater percentage of their resources into guns and less into butter than richer adversaries would, thus compounding the e¤ects of initial resource poverty. Although this …nding appears consistent with some evidence -wars tend to be concentrated in poorer countries in terms of income per capita -we need to be careful in distinguishing resource poverty from actual poverty in terms of income.
Furthermore, we consider the e¤ect of the number of adversaries on the chance of peace. In models of con ‡ict (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, 1995) , a greater number of adversaries intensi…es con ‡ict by increasing the resources devoted to guns and by reducing the resources devoted to butter. This property implies, however, that the returns to investments in con ‡ict management could be higher when there are more rather than fewer adversaries. This indeed occurs, and a greater number of adversaries increases the probability of peace, when adversaries start with their own resources -like when a new country enters an existing con ‡ict. When, how-ever, a greater number of adversaries is the result of the fragmentation of existing adversaries, like it can occur in civil wars, the e¤ect of a greater number of adversaries is to reduce investments in con ‡ict management and the probability of peace.
THE BASIC INGREDIENTS: GUNS, BUTTER, AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Suppose there are n potential adversaries indexed by i 2 f1; 2:::ng: In each period of interaction there is useful production -"butter" -that is contested by the adversaries. Each party possesses a resource of size R that can be used to produce butter (b i ), can be allocated to guns (g i ) or be spent on investments in con ‡ict management (m i ). Speci…cally, we have
Guns are used to determine the distribution of butter in a way that we will describe later. Although the classic trade-o¤ between guns and butter is easy to understand, we need to explain the ways in which con ‡ict management can be a costly alternative to these two other choices. Let us note …rst that we would be hard-pressed to …nd cases of con ‡ict in which there has been absolutely no communication or diplomatic activity between adversaries. In the case of states, there is formal diplomatic communication up to the point of declaration of war and often back-channel diplomacy after that. In the case of civil wars and other types of con ‡ict, leaders of competing groups engage in intermittent diplomacy and communication either directly or through third parties. When there is a truce or peace, adversaries prepare for war and when there is war the adversaries have to keep an eye for the possibility of peace, whose time, one way or another, will eventually come. Such communication and diplomatic activity between rivals can occupy much of the time of the leaders and their sta¤, time that could be devoted to a more e¤ective prosecution of war, and is therefore costly.
However, these are not the sole costs of con ‡ict management by any means. Ultimately, peace depends on the development of lasting institutions. Within countries, the development of constitutions, legislation, administrative procedures, and courts that divert contention from the battle…eld and the streets to ordinary politics and the courts require much debate, time, and e¤ort. Sovereign states also have developed institutions and organizations to mediate disputes among themfrom the World Court to the WTO, as well as the UN. Moreover, states strive to develop relationships with potential adversaries, not only for economic reasons but for purely security purposes as well. The original members of the European Community came together at least partly as a way of building more permanent economic ties so that the likelihood of a repetition of the previous two wars was reduced. Sometimes, costly investments in con ‡ict management can take very interesting, perhaps ingenious, forms, as in the case of the "podesta" in twelfth century Genoa (Greif, 1998) . Furthermore, norms and voluntary associations that have been lately discussed under the name of "social capital" (Putnam, 1993) can be considered forms of capital that reduce con ‡ict and which require investments over long periods of time.
To make the presentation as simple as possible, we suppose two periods. In the …rst period the adversaries make the choice between guns, butter, and investment in con ‡ict management but war always occurs. Investment in con ‡ict management can bear fruit only in the second period by increasing the chance that peace will occur then.
When war occurs in either period, the division of output, of butter, is determined by guns through a "contest success function" p i (g t ) where g t´( g 1t ; ::::g nt ) is the amount of guns chosen by all sides in period t = 1; 2. Letting G t denote the total number of guns in a period, G t = P n j=1 g jt , we use the following functional form for the contest success function:
In the …rst period, since investments in con ‡ict management can have an e¤ect only in the second period, con ‡ict is unavoidable. Thus, a party i 's share of the net output in the …rst period is a function of its relative armament and its …rst-period payo¤, and is given by
where M = P i m i is the total investment in con ‡ict management. Please note that we do not make a distinction here between the probability of winning in the case of con ‡ict and the share of total output received by an adversary. Under risk neutrality and our other assumptions the two interpretations of the contest success function in (2) -as a probability or as a share -coincide. There are of course many reasons that would make the probability of winning di¤erent from the share, including the destruction that con ‡ict induces, risk preference, and complementarities in production or consumption. However, since we don't see a reason for our qualitative results to be a¤ected by complicating the model so as to allow between a hot war and a cold war, we chose to go with the simpler formulation. This is of course not to say that no additional insight could be gained by allowing for a richer environment.
In the second period, the same choices regarding the disposition of resources are available but obviously, because there is no future beyond that, there is no reason to invest in con ‡ict management. The …rst period's investments in con ‡ict management, however, have an e¤ect on how the available surplus is divided. In particular, the more the two sides have invested in con ‡ict management the higher is the probability that they will cooperate and will not need to resort to guns to divide the total surplus.
Let m = (m 1 ; m 2 ; :::m n ) describe the investment in con ‡ict management the n parties engage in. The probability of cooperation is a function q(m) that takes values between 0 and 1 and has the following properties. One would expect q(m) to be symmetric, non-decreasing and concave in each of its arguments. Because peace cannot be achieved with just a subset of the adversaries and, moreover, it requires the active participation of all parties, we should expect an increase in the investment of one party to increase the marginal return to the other parties.
In other words, we should expect to have complementarities among the levels of investment of the participants. Finally, one would expect that if all parties are investing the same amount m in con ‡ict management and one additional contender investing m is added, the probability of cooperation does not increase. In fact, under such circumstances we assume that the probability of cooperation remains unchanged when a player is added. A functional form that we will use later and which satis…es all the above properties is:
The parameter ® is a measure of returns to scale (or, of the degree of homogeneity) of the investment function. When ® = 1 a simultaneous doubling of all parties's investments in con ‡ict management would also double the probability of peace. When ® < 1 a doubling of all investments would less than double the probability of peace. This functional form will allow us to illustrate more precisely the e¤ect of cooperative investment in con ‡ict management.
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Given their investments in con ‡ict management in the …rst period, in the second period the adversaries face a probability of peace, q(m), and a probability of war, 1 ¡ q(m). Based on these probabilities and without knowing the outcome, the adversaries make their choice between guns (g i2 ) and butter (R ¡ g i2 ). In the event of peace they hold on to the butter they have produced, whereas under war all the butter that is available is divided in accordance with the relative amount of guns each adversary possesses. The amount spent on guns is lost in either case. Therefore, the second-period payo¤s are the following:
A strategy for an agent i, s i , is a triplet s i´( m i ; g i1 ; g i2 ). Let S i ½ < 3 + be the set of feasible strategies for agent i, S i´f g i1 ; m i ; g i2¸0 j g i1 + m · R and g i2 · Rg, and S = S 1 £ S 2 ::: £ S n . A strategy pro…le is s = (s 1 ; s 2 :::s n ) 2 S.
The payo¤ function over the two periods is simply the sum of the two singleperiod payo¤s.
HOW MANY GUNS AND WHAT IS THE CHANCE OF PEACE?
In the …rst period, the adversaries make decisions about guns (g i1 ), investments in con ‡ict management (m i ) and, implicitly, by (1) on butter for the …rst period. However, in doing so they both a¤ect what can be expected to occur in the second period and, in turn, the predictable consequences of …rst period actions should be taken into account in determining those actions. Therefore, in accordance with the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, we begin in reverse order, by considering what would occur in the second period given the actions of the …rst period. The equilibrium concept used is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium:
De…nition 1 A Nash Equilibrium of this game is a strategy pro…le is s ¤ = (s
and s ¤ is subgame perfect if no party has interest to deviate from it in the second period.
SECOND-PERIOD OUTCOME
Consider the second period …rst. At the beginning of the second period, given all investment in con ‡ict management has already been undertaken, the probabilities of peace and con ‡ict are already given.
Party i chooses his level of guns taking the amount of guns acquired by the other parties as given. The …rst order condition for an interior choice of guns is given by
Clearly, if q(m) = 1 there won't be any con ‡ict in the second period and therefore there would not be any reason to choose a positive level of guns. In this case g i2 has to be 0 in equilibrium. Consider now a situation in which con ‡ict occurs with a positive probability, q(m) < 1. Notice then that, if he were not to invest in any guns, the …rst term, i.e. the marginal bene…t of guns, would become
(1 ¡ q)nR. Hence, if the other parties were to invest hardly anything and G 2 were to be very close to 0, i's marginal utility from some guns would tend to in…nity. In other words, if there a chance of con ‡ict, no matter how small, there has to be some guns in equilibrium. Agent i would acquire an amount of guns that would equate his marginal bene…t to his marginal cost, so that (8) is 0. By having all parties going through the same calculus, it can be shown that that there is a unique equilibrium outcome in the second period in which g ¤ i2 = g ¤ 2 for all i = 1; :::n with
Hence, the total amount of guns as a measure of the total level of con ‡ict in the second period is G ¤ 2 = (n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q(m))R Clearly, the equilibrium level of armaments depends on the investment in con ‡ict management via the probabilities with which peace and con ‡ict arise. If q(m) = 1 then no gun investments will be made in the second period. Moreover, for a given probability of con ‡ict, the higher the level of resources R is and the more adversaries n there are, the higher is the level of con ‡ict.
Using the equilibrium level of guns (9) in (5), the second-period utility in equilibrium is
FIRST PERIOD AND INVESTMENTS IN CONFLICT MAN-AGEMENT
Consider now the decisions to be made in the …rst period. Given the second period outcomes that can be induced by any choices made in the …rst period, contender i tries to maximize (6)
n ¡ 1 nI n this …rst period, each adversary makes choices on …rst-period guns (g 1 i ) and on investments in con ‡ict management (m i ). An interior solution for i's investment in con ‡ict management would satisfy
where
is the marginal impact of i's investment in con ‡ict management on the probability of peace. The …rst, negative term represents the marginal cost of investing in con ‡ict management. Note that this marginal cost is just a fraction of its actual resource cost, the share of guns he has. Other things being equal, the larger is the number of contenders, the lower is this marginal cost. The second term represents the marginal bene…t of investing in con ‡ict management and comes from the second period payo¤. Other things being equal an increase in the number of adversaries n increases this marginal bene…t. That marginal bene…t is also increasing in the amount of resources, R, that each party possesses.
The …rst order condition tells us that an interior solution for party i's gun acquisition is given by
Consider this expression. By the same argument made earlier, if no one were to invest in guns i's marginal utility from investing in some guns would be in…nite, and therefore there is a strictly positive level of armaments in equilibrium in the …rst period. For the same reasons outlined in our second period analysis there is a unique equilibrium level of guns acquisition in the …rst period where g ¤ i1 = g ¤ 1 for all i = 1; 2:::n and
Let us next consider the speci…c function mapping the investment in con ‡ict management into the likelihood of avoiding con ‡ict introduced in (4) and study the di¤erent equilibria that could prevail.
EQUILIBRIA
We now show that typically there are two equilibria: One in which no party makes any investments in con ‡ict management and another in which there are positive investments. We shall examine and discuss this second type of equilibrium more than the …rst as it is Pareto-superior and also richer in its implications.
With a probability of cooperation given by (4) the …rst-order condition for m i (11) implies
First, note that if a single agent were not to invest in con ‡ict management, m j = 0 for any j 6 = i, then the other agents have no incentive to invest in con ‡ict management. We would have q i (m) = 0 and m i = 0 for all i. There is no investment that i could undertake that could a¤ect the probability of peace. Hence, there is always a Nash Equilibrium at
yielding to each contender a total utility over the two periods of U i (s ¤ ) =
R . In such case the total amount of guns is G = n¡1 n 2R. We call this equilibrium the pure con ‡ict equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is plausible since to achieve peace all parties would have to acquiesce to it by investing at least something in managing con ‡ict. It therefore follows that if none of one's adversaries were to invest in con ‡ict management, he or she would not invest either.
Next consider positive investments in con ‡ict management. Assume that m j 6 = 0 for all j 6 = i. Using the fact that in equilibrium g 1 = ::: = g n (and therefore (14), it is easy to see that i's choice of investment is given by the following expression
Clearly the amounts invested in con ‡ict management by the di¤erent agents are strategic complements as long as peace is uncertain (m i <
). The more the others invest the more one is willing to spent to reduce con ‡ict. Once the investments are such that the likelihood of con ‡ict is reduced to zero (m i¸(
then naturally i would be happy to reduce his investment as long as it does a¤ect the probability of peace. This is that strategic substituability that appears in the second line of (16).
Since all agents are identical and given the symmetry and complementarity of q(m), the equilibrium has to be symmetric. In the equilibrium, each agent chooses the same investment in con ‡ict management, m 1 = m 2 = ::::m n = m ¤ , and therefore
It is helpful to consider the cases of decreasing returns to scale (® < 1) and constant returns (® = 1) separately.
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Decreasing returns to scale in con ‡ict management ( ® < 1)
The total of these investments generates a probability q(m
that is strictly lower than 1. We can call this equilibrium partial cooperation.
The amount of guns a contender acquires in the second period is g 1¡®) ) and in the …rst period is g
(which is actually less than in the second period if
2R. The equilibrium payo¤ of each adversary can be shown to be strictly higher than that under pure con ‡ict, and therefore this equilibrium which always exists is Pareto-superior.
invests in con ‡ict management the maximum amount possible m ¤ = (1=¹) 1=® . The probability of peace is 1 and therefore no guns are acquired in the second period (g ¤ 2 = 0). In addition, the investment in con ‡ict management made in the …rst period reduces the amount of guns each party accumulates in that period, g
Hence, the total amount spent on guns over the two periods is greatly reduced, G ¤ = (n ¡ 1) (R¡(1=¹) 1=® ). We call such an equilibrium pure cooperation. Again, the equilibrium payo¤s are higher than that under pure con ‡ict and are Pareto dominant.
Constant returns to scale in con ‡ict management ( ® = 1) When n¡1 n ¹R < 1; it can be shown that no equilibrium other than pure con ‡ict exists. The marginal payo¤s to investing in con ‡ict management are too low for any adversaries to put anything in such an investment. When, however, n¡1 n ¹R¸1 the marginal bene…t of investing in con ‡ict management is equal or higher to its marginal cost, and all parties put the maximum amount possible to con ‡ict management, m ¤ = 1=¹:
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In such a case, peace obtains with probability one, we have pure cooperation.
Thus, under decreasing returns to scale in con ‡ict management there is always an equilibrium, either with partial cooperation or with pure cooperation, that Pareto-dominates pure con ‡ict, whereas under the limiting case of constant returns there is no possibility of obtaining partial cooperation as an equilibrium; at low levels of resources R, "productivity" of con ‡ict management as indicated by the parameter ¹, and numbers of adversaries n, pure con ‡ict obtains uniquely, whereas at su¢ciently high levels of the same parameters, pure cooperation becomes an equilibrium.
In this section we have identi…ed the conditions under which multiple equilibria occur and described the di¤erent equilibria. It is worth realizing that when multiple equilibria prevails in this game a simple re…nement would select the equilibrium with the least con ‡ict. Introducing a commonly held belief under which all players have a strictly positive (even if very small) probability to invest a positive amount in con ‡ict mangement. Then there is strictly positive probability of peace if an agent invests a positive amount, and it is indeed in his interest to do so when an equilibrium other than pure con ‡ict exists. Hence, it this sense we would expect the Pareto dominant equilibrium to be selected. Note, however, that any form of discounting would lower the bene…t from con ‡ict management, thereby increasing the range of parameter values under which the con ‡ict equilibrium is unique.
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We now turn to other factors that in ‡uence investment in con ‡ict management.
NUMBER OF CONTENDERS, RESOURCES, AND PEACE
How is the probability of peace a¤ected by an increase in the number of parties involved? And how does the amount of resources in ‡uence the likelihood of peace? In the case of pure con ‡ict, both per capita and the total amount of guns in this equilibrium G = (n ¡ 1) 2R are increasing in the number of contenders, and the utility of each of them decreases. To answer such questions for the other, more interesting equilibria, it is useful to distinguish between a situation in which additional adversaries have their own resources R; and a situation in which the amount of total resource is constant at a level R and is divided up among the adversaries R = R n . The former situation can be considered one of replication of the adversaries and is perhaps more …tting to cases of international con ‡ict. The latter situation with a …xed amount of total resources is one of fragmentation and would be more appropriate for cases of internal, domestic con ‡ict.
REPLICATION OR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Each party's investment in con ‡ict management is given by (17) whose …rst term is increasing in n while the second term is unchanged. As the number of parties involved increases, the total amount of guns that would be acquired in the absence of con ‡ict management increases. Hence, the cost of con ‡ict increases and the bene…ts from investing in con ‡ict management increase. This implies that for ® < 1 the more parties gets involved in the potential con ‡ict the higher the probability of peace in a partial cooperation equilibrium and the more likely this probability will be 1 and we will have a pure cooperation equilibrium.
In the case constant returns to scale (® = 1), we saw that if n¡1 n ¹R > 1 a pure cooperation equilibrium exists in addition to the pure con ‡ict one. Clearly the greater the number of contenders is the more likely it is that this pure cooperation equilibrium will exist. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the probability of cooperation and the number of parties involved for both ® = 1 and ® < 1: 10 Finally, the richer are the parties, the greater is the probability of peace. Beyond a certain threshold level of resources (R ¤ = n (n¡1)®¹ 1=® ), the probability of peace is one.
FRAGMENTATION OR DOMESTIC CONFLICT
In this case, with the total amount of resources …xed, an increase in the number of adversaries implies a reduction in the amount that each contender has; that is, R = R n . Under the pure con ‡ict equilibrium, although per capita armaments decreases as fragmentation increases (g = n¡1 n 2 2R) the total amount of guns in this equilibrium G = n¡1 n 2R increases in n. For the other types of equilibrium investment in con ‡ict management (17) we have
The …rst term of this expression is for the case of partial cooperation and is clearly decreasing in n: The second term, re ‡ecting the pure cooperation case, is independent of n but to reach that equilibrium with a larger n a higher level of total resources R would be needed. For values of ® lower than 1, partial cooperation becomes less as fragmentation increases, and in this case the amount invested in con ‡ict management decreases. For ® = 1 we saw that either there exists another equilibrium in which pure cooperation is achieved or pure con ‡ict is the unique equilibrium. Hence, as the degree of fragmentation increases, at some point the pure cooperation equilibrium will disappear; that is, the range of parameters values such that a pure cooperation equilibrium exists is smaller as n becomes larger. The e¤ects of fragmentation on the probability of peace are illustrated in Figure 2 for ® = 1 and ® < 1.
Figure 2 about here
Note, however, than increasing the amount of resources at stake has the same e¤ect on both international and domestic con ‡ict. Higher levels of resources make con ‡ict relatively costly and they also simply leave more room in the "budget" allocation for investments in con ‡ict management. With more resource, the range of parameters under which a pure cooperation equilibrium exists and the probability of peace increases in a partial cooperation equilibrium. That is, we have a rather robust …nding: more wealth increases the chance of peace.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Peace does not come without negotiation, without the development of a measure of trust, and ultimately without the presence of institutions that will maintain it into the future. All these require e¤ort and expense that has to be undertaken by all interested parties. Making peace is an endeavor that entails much uncertainty and the chance of success should depend on the degree of e¤ort, the size of the investments in con ‡ict management. The model we have developed in this paper is the …rst to take these considerations into account. Naturally, there might be other interesting ways of formulating the problem but there is no reason for our main …ndings to change. What would be interesting for future research is to consider substantive issues that we have not examined here. Among the most promising would be to consider the possibility of the formation of alliances among the participants. Often con ‡ict is bipolar, not multipolar. Is there a natural dynamic that makes a large number of participants to divide themselves into two sides, by having peace made …rst amongst the members of each side? We intend to examine questions like this one in the future.
Endnotes

1
In many cases, cooperative equilibria are not "renegotiation-proof" while con ‡ictual equilibria are. Hirshleifer and Martinez-Coll (1988) provide evidence on the fragility of the tit-for-tat stratety, the winning strategy in Axelrod's (1984) tournament. In addition, a "long shadow of the future" can be shown to intensify con ‡ict (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1996) or lead to con ‡ict (Gar…nkel and Skaperdas, 2000) in non-stationary environments.
2
That is, in the language of Collier and Hoe-er (2002) the actions that are undertaken are out of "greed" rather than "grievance." Genoa was ravaged by Civil War between rival clans during the second half of the twelfth century and the institution of podesta was introduced as a way of reducing that con ‡ict towards the end of that time. The podesta was typically a foreign noble who was hired for a term of one year and was expected to perform police, judicial, and administrative functions. He was very well paid and he had some enforcement power through his armed retinue, but not enough to upset the balance of power between the rival clans. See Greif (1998) for details. Based on cross-country regressions, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) estimate risk factors that in ‡uence the incidence of civil wars that are broadly consistent with our …ndings, although there is no explicit variable in the empirical framework to stand for investments in con ‡ict management.
4
Tullock (1980) …rst employed this functional form in his study of rent-seeking contests. For a discussion of this and another class of functional forms see Hirshleifer (1989) . For an axiomatic derivation of general functional forms as well as of this particular one, see Skaperdas (1996) .
5
The economists among the readers will notice that this is an o¤shoot of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The same analysis holds for all functional forms belonging to the CES class of functions: q(m) = This solution is unique since along i's best response (BR i )
for any two i; j 2 f1; :::ng which is positive whenever g i2 > g j2 and negative whenever g i2 < g j2 : At g j2 = g i2 , dg i2 dg j2 j BR i = 0.
7
We do not examine the case of increasing returns to scale (® > 1) because if an equilibrium other than pure con ‡ict were to exist, it would be unstable.
8
Note that for ® = 1 in the special case in which n¡1 n ¹R = 1, all levels of con ‡ict management m could be chosen, there is a continuum of equilibria with a probability of cooperation ranging from 0 to 1. However, any small perturbation of the parameters makes the equilibrium shift in one or the two extreme cases, pure con ‡ict or pure cooperation (when the latter case exists).
9
The opposite would occur of course, if we allowed for con ‡ict to be destructive and thus yield a lower payo¤ than a negotiated settlement under the threar of con ‡ict. We have avoided making the distinction between actual (and destructive) con ‡cit versus a negotiated settlement for ease of exposition. For a framework that allows for this distinction and which examines the circumstances that lead to either con ‡ict or settlement (but with arming), see Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2000) .
